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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This case requires us to decide whether the Delaware 
Elections Disclosure Act (the “Act”) is constitutional as 
applied1 to a 2014 Voter Guide (“Voter Guide”) that Appellee 
Delaware Strong Families (“DSF”) intended to produce and 
distribute.  DSF’s Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment 
that the Act’s disclosure provisions are unconstitutional and a 
preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the Act.  
The United States District Court for the District of Delaware 
(“District Court”) granted the preliminary injunction 
declaring that the Act’s disclosure requirements are 
unconstitutional.  Because the Act is narrowly tailored and 
not impermissibly broad we will reverse the District Court 
and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 On October 23, 2013, DSF filed a Complaint alleging 
both facial and as-applied challenges to the Act.2  DSF 
                                              
1 DSF initially brought the instant action arguing 
overbreadth and vagueness.  The District Court concluded 
that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to DSF; 
therefore, it did not reach the facial challenge.  Del. Strong 
Families v. Biden, 34 F. Supp. 3d 381, 394 (D. Del. 2014). 
 
2 The lawyers representing DSF in this appeal filed 
similar complaints in Colorado and Washington D.C. 
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planned to distribute the 2014 Voter Guide over the internet 
within sixty days of Delaware’s general election and planned 
to spend more than $500 on its creation and distribution. 3  
The State of Delaware (“State”) filed an answer and issued 
various discovery requests.  DSF moved for a protective order 
and preliminary injunction.  The District Court denied DSF’s 
motion for a protective order and instructed the parties to 
submit briefs addressing whether the Act is constitutional.  
J.A. 5–6.  On March 31, 2014, Judge Robinson issued an 
opinion granting a preliminary injunction against Appellants 
and, on April 8, 2014, entered an order granting DSF’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  Id. at 4.  This appeal 
followed. 
                                              
3 The proposed 2014 Voter Guide is not part of the 
record.  However, in its Complaint DSF alleges that “[i]n 
2014, DSF plans to produce and disseminate voter guides in a 
manner substantively similar to the process used in 2012.”  
J.A. 45.  The 2012 Voter Guide lists a series of statements 
concerning, inter alia, “[a] Single Payer Healthcare System”; 
adding gender identity to the protected classes in Delaware 
law; “[s]trengthening and maintaining marriage as the union 
of one man and one woman”; and “[p]rohibit[ing] coverage 
for abortion in the state insurance exchanges mandated by the 
new federal health care law.”  J.A. 61–64.  It also lists all 
Delaware federal and state candidates and their respective 
stances in support of or opposition to each statement.  The 
answers were provided by the candidates themselves or, if no 
response was submitted, were gleaned from the candidates’ 
“voting records, public statements, and/or campaign 
literature.”  J.A. 61.  In its Brief, DSF states that:  “In 2014, 
DSF will . . . distribute this same voter guide, updated to 
apply to the upcoming election.”  Appellee Br. at 15. 
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 In 2012, DSF disseminated its 2012 Voter Guide 
without having to disclose its donors.  However, enactment of 
the Act on January 1, 2013, changed the relevant disclosure 
requirements.  The Act requires “[a]ny person . . . who makes 
an expenditure for any third-party advertisement that causes 
the aggregate amount of expenditures for third-party 
advertisements made by such person to exceed $500 during 
an election period [to] file a third-party advertisement report 
with the Commissioner.”  15 Del. C. § 8031(a). 
 The Act defines a “third-party advertisement” in part 
as “an electioneering communication.”  Id. § 8002(27).  An 
electioneering communication is: 
a communication by any individual or other 
person (other than a candidate committee or a 
political party) that:  1. Refers to a clearly 
identified candidate; and 2. Is publicly 
distributed within 30 days before a primary 
election . . . or 60 days before a general election 
to an audience that includes members of the 
electorate for the office sought by such 
candidate.  
Id. § 8002(10)(a).  The “third-party advertisement report” 
must include “[t]he full name and mailing address of each 
person who has made contributions to [DSF] during the 
election period in an aggregate amount or value in excess of 
$100.”  Id. § 8031(a)(3).  Disclosure is not limited to 
individuals who earmarked their donations to fund an 
electioneering communication. 
 The Act’s application here is undisputed since the 
Voter Guide:  1) meets the definition of “electioneering 
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communication,” 2) would be distributed on the internet 
within the sixty days prior to Delaware’s general election, and 
3) would cost DSF more than $500 to produce. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1).  We exercise plenary review over a challenge to 
the constitutionality of a statute.  United States v. Pendleton, 
636 F.3d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 2011).  In reviewing the grant or 
denial of a preliminary injunction, we employ a “tripartite 
standard of review”:  findings of fact are reviewed for clear 
error, legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the 
decision to grant or deny an injunction is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.  K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. 
Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013).  “The decision to issue 
a preliminary injunction is governed by a four-factor test.”  
Id.  The plaintiff must show:  1) likelihood of success on the 
merits; 2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm; 3) that 
denying relief would injure the plaintiff more than an 
injunction would harm the defendant; and 4) that granting 
relief would serve the public interest.  Id. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 We first address the District Court’s erroneous 
conclusion that the Act’s disclosure requirements are 
unconstitutionally broad by virtue of reaching “neutral 
communication[s]” by “neutral communicator[s].”  Del. 
Strong Families, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 395.  We then turn to the 
relevant Supreme Court precedent, which analyzed the 
federal statute comparable to the Act — the Bi-Partisan 
Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) — and compare the 
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respective disclosure requirements of BCRA and the Act to 
determine whether the Act survives constitutional scrutiny. 
 A. Advocacy and the Voter Guide 
 Campaign finance jurisprudence uses the terms 
“express advocacy” and “issue advocacy” to describe 
different types of election-related speech.  The former 
encompasses “communications that expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate,” Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976), while the latter are 
communications that seek to impact voter choice by focusing 
on specific issues.  The Supreme Court has consistently held 
that disclosure requirements are not limited to “express 
advocacy” and that there is not a “rigid barrier between 
express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy.”  McConnell 
v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003).  Any possibility that the 
Constitution limits the reach of disclosure to express 
advocacy or its functional equivalent is surely repudiated by 
Citizens United v. FEC, which stated:  “The principal opinion 
in [FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–76 
(2007)] limited . . . restrictions on independent expenditures 
to express advocacy and its functional equivalent.  Citizens 
United seeks to import a similar distinction into BCRA’s 
disclosure requirements.  We reject this contention.”  558 
U.S. 310, 368 (2010). 
 The District Court concluded that the Act’s disclosure 
requirements could not constitutionally reach DSF’s Voter 
Guide because it was a “neutral communication” by a 
“neutral communicator.”  Del. Strong Families, 34 F. Supp. 
3d at 395.  This formulation finds no support in the case law 
and is not one that we choose to adopt.  The District Court 
found that DSF was a presumed neutral communicator by 
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virtue of its status as a § 501(c)(3) organization.  Id.  
Similarly, DSF argues in its reply brief that, by virtue of this 
status, it is not permitted to engage in “any political campaign 
on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office.”  26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii).  The Act and 
§ 501(c)(3), however, are separate and unrelated, and DSF 
has offered no compelling reason to defer to the § 501(c)(3) 
scheme in determining which communications require 
disclosure under the Act.  Accordingly, we conclude that it is 
the conduct of an organization, rather than an organization’s 
status with the Internal Revenue Service, that determines 
whether it makes communications subject to the Act. 
 The District Court noted that voter guides are typically 
intended to influence voters even though they may “lack[] 
words of express advocacy.”  Del. Strong Families, 34 F. 
Supp. 3d at 394 n.19.  By selecting issues on which to focus, 
a voter guide that mentions candidates by name and is 
distributed close to an election is, at a minimum, issue 
advocacy.  Thus, the disclosure requirements can properly 
apply to DSF’s Voter Guide, which falls under the Act’s 
definition of “electioneering communication” by, among 
other things, mentioning candidates by name close to an 
election.  See 15 Del. C. § 8002(10)(a); see also McConnell, 
540 U.S. at 196 (endorsing the application of disclosure 
requirements to the “entire range” of similarly-defined 
“electioneering communications”).  As long as the Act 
survives exacting scrutiny, disclosure of DSF’s donors is 
constitutionally permissible. 
 Because it concluded that the Act impermissibly 
reached DSF’s Voter Guide as a general matter, the District 
Court did not analyze the Act’s specific requirements to 
determine whether it is sufficiently tailored to pass 
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constitutional muster.  It is this analysis that we engage in 
next. 
 B. Exacting Scrutiny 
 Acknowledging the interest in one’s privacy of 
association, the Supreme Court in Buckley announced that 
campaign finance disclosure requirements are reviewed under 
“exacting scrutiny.”  424 U.S. at 64–68.  This is a heightened 
level of scrutiny, which accounts for the general interest in 
associational privacy by requiring a “‘substantial relation’ 
between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently 
important’ governmental interest.”  Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 366–67 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64, 66).4 
 DSF acknowledges that Delaware’s interest in an 
informed electorate is a sufficiently important governmental 
interest.  Appellee Br. at 50.  “[D]isclosure provides the 
electorate with information ‘as to where political campaign 
money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate’ in 
order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek [] office.”  
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67.  The Supreme Court endorsed 
this interest in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81 (stating “disclosure 
helps voters to define more of the candidates’ 
constituencies”), and has reiterated its importance, see 
                                              
4 Exacting scrutiny differs from “strict scrutiny” — the 
most demanding level of scrutiny applied in the First 
Amendment context — in that it does not engage in a “least-
restrictive-alternative analysis.”  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989).  Strict scrutiny 
is reserved for restrictions on speech that are content or 
viewpoint based.  McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 
2534 (2014). 
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McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003) (countenancing 
the government’s informational interest and rejecting a 
challenge to BCRA’s disclosure provisions); Citizens United, 
558 U.S. at 371 (stating that “disclosure permits citizens . . . . 
to make informed decisions and give proper weight to 
different speakers and messages”); see also Human Life of 
Wash. Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“Providing information to the electorate is vital to the 
efficient functioning of the marketplace of ideas, and thus to 
advancing the democratic objectives underlying the First 
Amendment.”).  Therefore, we find that Delaware’s interest 
in an informed electorate is sufficiently important. 
 We now turn to the specific sections of the Act that 
DSF alleged in its Complaint were impermissibly broad5 and 
                                              
5 For the first time on appeal, DSF argued that the Act’s 
“election period” is impermissibly long.  The election period 
is essentially a “look back” period, requiring disclosure of 
donors who made donations during this defined time.  In 
keeping with the “general rule,” we will “not consider an 
issue not passed upon below.”  Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 120 (1976).  Even were we to reach this argument, it 
would not alter our conclusion.  It is true that the Act’s 
election period will generally be longer than BCRA’s.  
Compare 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(2)(F) (defining the election 
period as “beginning on the first day of the preceding 
calendar year and ending on the disclosure date”), with 15 
Del. C. § 8002(11)(3) (stating that “the election period shall 
begin and end at the same time as that of the candidate 
identified in such advertisement”).  We do not, however, find 
material to our analysis the difference between the Act’s 
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therefore did not bear a substantial relation to the Act’s 
disclosure requirements, to wit:  the monetary threshold and 
the type of media covered.  As noted above, the Supreme 
Court’s guidance in upholding BCRA’s disclosure provision 
under exacting scrutiny is particularly applicable to this case.  
The Act’s disclosure requirements are similar in structure and 
language to those of the analogous federal law.  Thus, in 
applying exacting scrutiny to the Act’s disclosure 
requirements, we will examine similar aspects of BCRA that 
the Court has upheld and consider whether the Act’s 
deviations from BCRA change the exacting scrutiny analysis. 
  1. Monetary Threshold 
 In Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that deciding 
where to locate a monetary threshold “is necessarily a 
judgmental decision, best left . . . to congressional discretion” 
and determined that the thresholds presented were not 
“wholly without rationality.”  424 U.S. at 83 (discussing 
thresholds for direct contributor disclosure).  Thus, even 
though election disclosure laws are analyzed under exacting 
scrutiny, we apply less searching review to monetary 
thresholds — asking whether they are “rationally related” to 
the State’s interest.  Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 
F.3d 34, 60 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Buckely and stating that 
“judicial deference [is granted] to plausible legislative 
judgments as to the appropriate location of a reporting 
threshold . . . unless they are wholly without rationality”) 
(quotation marks and internal citation omitted); Worley v. 
Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1251–52 (9th Cir. 2013) 
                                                                                                     
potential four year look-back and BCRA’s potential two year 
look-back period. 
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(same analysis of monetary thresholds in the political action 
committee context); Family PAC v. McKenna, 685 F.3d 800, 
811 (4th Cir. 2012) (same).   
 Under BCRA,6 groups that spend in excess of $10,000 
annually must report individual contributors of $1,000 or 
more.  52 U.S.C. § 30104(f)(1), (2)(F).  Under the Act, 
groups that spend more than $500 annually must report 
individual contributors of $100 or more.  15 Del. C. 
§ 8031(a)(3).  It is unsurprising that Delaware’s thresholds 
are lower than those for national elections.  Delaware is a 
small state where direct mail makes up 80% of campaign 
expenditures.  J.A. 135.  “[F]or less than $500 a campaign can 
place enough pre-recorded ‘robo-calls’ to reach every 
household in a Delaware House district.  If a hyper-targeted 
recipient list is used, as is common in campaigns, $150 would 
suffice.”  J.A. 137.  The expenditure thresholds are supported 
by the record and are rationally related to Delaware’s unique 
election landscape. 
  2. Type of Media Covered 
 BCRA defines “electioneering communication” as 
“any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication,” 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30104(f)(3)(A)(i), except the following:  “a communication 
appearing in a news story, commentary, or editorial 
distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, 
unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political 
                                              
6 As of September 1, 2014, the relevant provisions of 
BCRA were transferred from 2 U.S.C. § 437 to 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30104.  We use the updated citations, but note, in the 
interest of clarity, that the District Court opinion and other 
disclosure-related opinions employ the old citations. 
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party, political committee, or candidate”; “a communication 
which constitutes an expenditure or an independent 
expenditure under this Act”; and “a communication which 
constitutes a candidate debate or forum.”  Id. 
§ 30104(f)(3)(B)(i–iii). 
 The Act is broader, defining “communications media” 
as “television, radio, newspaper or other periodical, sign, 
Internet, mail or telephone.”  15 Del. C. § 8002(7).  Excluded 
from the Act’s definition of “electioneering communication” 
are the following:  “membership communication”; 
“communication appearing in a news article, editorial, 
opinion, or commentary, provided that such communication is 
not distributed via any communications media owned or 
controlled by any candidate, political committee or the person 
purchasing such communication”; and “communication made 
in any candidate debate or forum.”  Id. § 8002(10)(b)(2–4). 
 Though the Act reaches non-broadcast media (by 
including direct mail and the internet), it is not unique in this 
regard.  Many other state statutes also include non-broadcast 
media.7  Furthermore, the media covered by the Act reflects 
the media actually used by candidates for office in Delaware, 
and thus it bears a substantial relation to Delaware’s interest 
                                              
7 Nine other state statutes include direct mail.  See Col. 
Const. art. XXVIII, § 2(7)(a); AS § 15.13.400(3); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. § 9-601b(a)(2)(B); Idaho Code Ann. § 67-6602(f)(1); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 55, § 1; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-278.6(8j); 
17 V.S.A. § 2901(11); RCW § 42.17A.005(19)(a); W. Va. 
Code § 3-8-1a(12)(A).  Three state statutes include internet 
communications.  See AS § 15.13.400(3); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 
9-601b(a)(2)(B); 17 V.S.A. § 2901(11). 
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in an informed electorate.  Delaware does not have its own 
major-network television station and campaign television 
advertisements on nearby Pennsylvania and Maryland 
stations are both expensive and “generally a poor investment, 
given that they reach primarily non-Delaware voters.”  J.A. 
134.  Statewide campaigns use radio advertising, but this “is 
typically too expensive for most legislative or local races.”  
J.A. 135. 
 Had the legislature limited “electioneering 
communication” to media not actually utilized in Delaware 
elections, the disclosure requirements would fail to serve the 
State’s interest in a well-informed electorate thereby resulting 
in a weaker fit between the two.  Accordingly, we find that 
the media covered by the Act is sufficiently tailored to 
Delaware’s interest. 
 C. Earmarking 
 Throughout its brief, DSF represents that BCRA limits 
disclosure to those donors who earmarked their donations to 
fund electioneering communications (Appellee Brief at 5, 20, 
33, 36) and implies that, to survive constitutional scrutiny, the 
Act must be similarly limited.  However, BCRA itself does 
not contain an earmarking requirement.  Rather, after the 
Court decided McConnell, the Federal Elections Commission 
(“FEC”) passed 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9), which contained an 
earmarking limitation. 8  The FEC regulation was in effect 
                                              
8 “Statements of electioneering communications filed 
under paragraph (b) of this section shall disclose the 
following information . . . .  If the disbursements were made 
by a corporation or labor organization pursuant to 11 CFR 
§ 114.15, the name and address of each person who made a 
16 
 
when Citizens United was decided, but it was thereafter 
vacated as “an unreasonable interpretation of [] BCRA.”  Van 
Hollen v. FEC, No. 11-0766, 2014 WL 6657240, at *1 
(D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2014).9 
 Nothing in Citizens United implies that the Court 
relied upon the FEC earmarking regulation when approving 
of BCRA’s disclosure regime.  The opinion does not mention 
                                                                                                     
donation aggregating $1,000 or more to the corporation or 
labor organization, aggregating since the first day of the 
preceding calendar year, which was made for the purpose of 
furthering electioneering communications.”  11 C.F.R. 
§ 104.20(c)(9) (2014) (emphasis added). 
 
9 In 2012, the D.C. District Court first invalidated the 
FEC regulation for impermissibly altering the meaning of 
BCRA.  Van Hollen v. FEC, 851 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D.D.C. 
2012).  The FEC did not appeal this ruling, but the Center for 
Individual Freedom intervened.  The D.C. Circuit reversed, 
holding that the District Court erred in disposing of the case 
under Chevron step one, but remanded with instructions for 
the District Court to refer the matter to the FEC to explain the 
meaning and scope of the regulation or to engage in further 
rulemaking to clarify.  Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Van 
Hollen, 694 F.3d 108, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2012).  The FEC 
decided not to undertake further rulemaking.  Van Hollen, 
2014 WL 6657240, at *4.  In its 2014 decision, the D.C. 
District Court once again invalidated the FEC regulation, this 
time holding under Chevron step two that the regulation was 
arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at *1.  The Center for Individual 
Freedom filed its notice of appeal in January 2015; resolution 
of this matter is still pending. 
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earmarking and 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9) is not cited.  As 
such, DSF’s representation that the Act must limit disclosure 
to those donors who earmarked their donations to fund 
electioneering communications is unavailing. 
 Our analysis does not change simply because an 
earmarking limitation would result in a more narrowly 
tailored statute.  As discussed above, a disclosure requirement 
is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which necessitates a 
“substantial relationship” between the State’s interest and the 
disclosure required.  The Act marries one-time, event-driven 
disclosures to the applicable “election period,” which is itself 
controlled by the relevant candidate’s term.  This provides the 
necessary “substantial relationship” between the disclosure 
required and Delaware’s informational interest.10 
                                              
10 Disclosure that is singular and event-driven is “far less 
burdensome than the comprehensive registration and 
reporting system [oftentimes] imposed on political 
committees.”  Barland, 751 F.3d at 824 (discussing Citizens 
United and BCRA).  But see Worley, 717 F.3d at 1250 
(rejecting facial challenge to ongoing [political action 
committee] reporting regime by four individuals who wanted 
to spend $600 because such regime was not overly 
burdensome and “require[s] little more if anything than a 
prudent person or group would do in these circumstances 
anyway”).  A comparison of the Act’s political action 
committee (“PAC”) disclosure requirements to the disclosure 
required of DSF shows that the former is much more 
extensive.  Under § 8030, a PAC is required to file ongoing 
reports that disclose, inter alia:  assets on hand; the name and 
address of each person making contributions in excess of 
$100; the name and address of each political committee from 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 As demonstrated above, the Act is constitutional as 
applied to DSF’s Voter Guide, therefore DSF has not 
established likelihood of success on the merits.  We need not 
analyze the other factors implicating a preliminary injunction 
analysis.  Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion 
in granting the preliminary injunction in favor of DSF.  For 
the foregoing reasons we will reverse the judgment of the 
District Court granting DSF’s motion for preliminary 
injunction and remand for entry of judgment in favor of 
Appellants. 
                                                                                                     
or to which it made any transfer of funds; the amount of each 
debt in excess of $50; proceeds from ticket sales, collections, 
and sales of items; total expenditures; and all goods and 
services contributed in kind.  15 Del. C. § 8030(d)(1–2), (4–
5), (6a–c), (10–11).  Whereas DSF — and other organizations 
making “electioneering communications” — are required to 
make much more limited disclosures, and then only when a 
triggering communication is made.  Id. § 8005.  Whether the 
Act’s disclosure requirements for PACs would be overly 
burdensome as applied to DSF is not an issue that is before us 
and thus is not one we reach today. 
